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Abstract
This paper analyses the tax competition mechanisms in a context of commodity
trade. We show that the trade market equilibrium may restore the efficiency of
the public good provision when agents from different countries have symmetric
preferences. Asymmetry in preferences implies over or underprovision in public
goods depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. In both cases,
the price adjustment leaves the capital stock unchanged so that the stock of capital
is not affected by the taxes. Finally, we show that the centralized choice does not
systematically restore the efficiency of the public good provision.
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1 Introduction
Our paper revisits the tax competition literature by introducing commodity trade in a
standard tax competition model. While in an integrated world, both international trade
and capital mobility are important issues, only little attention has been devoted to the
analysis of tax competition in a context of trade. This is the purpose of this paper which
aims to analyse the consequences of trade balance on tax competition mechanisms when
countries are either symmetric or asymmetric.
The tax competition literature highlights the impact of capital mobility and the
ajustments on the capital market that imply low taxes and the underprovision of the
public goods (cf Zodow & Mieszkowki (1986), Wildasin (1989), Wilson (1986)). A huge
literature based on these seminal articles has extended these results in a context of
labor mobility (Bucovetsky & Wilson (1991), Wilson (1995)) or asymmetric countries
(Bucovestky (1991)). The number of competing regions on the equilibrium tax has been
also analysed in Hoyt (1991)1.
Few papers have dealt with the introduction of trade in a tax competition model.
Most of these papers have limited their analysis to a lump sum tax so that there is no
distortionary effect of taxes on consumption (cf Turnovsky (1988), Chari and Kehoe
(1990)). Other papers considered a production and/or consumption tax that avoids any
capital tax competition effects (Devereux (1991), Devereux and Mansoorian (1992)).
Another strand of the literature has dealt with the effect of tax exporting in models of
trade on the public good provision. While it is widely held that tax exporting, by shifting
the burden of taxes on the non residents, stimulates the provision of local public goods
(see for instance Oates (1972)), Wildasin (1987a) and (1987b) mitigates these results
by introductiong a labor tax that leads the exported tax to raise the same incremental
revenue as the non exported tax. Wildasin (1993) goes further by introducing a capital
tax rate in the model to analyze the consequences of fiscal competition with interindustry
trade. However the analysis is limited to the case of two regions considered as rather
small compared to the world economy so that the return of capital is taken as fixed and
does not serve as a channel of policy transmission.
Exceptions are Wilson (1987) and Becker & Runkel (2012). In both models, the
introduction of trade in a capital tax competition model crucially modifies the results of
the standard tax competition literature. In line with these models, we show that trade
1See also Wildasin & Wilson (2004) for a survey on capital tax competition literature.
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may reinforce an inefficient distribution of public goods in a context of trade equilibrium.
In his paper, Wilson shows that trade creates, in addition to an inefficient distribution
of public goods across regions, an inefficient pattern of trade. He develops a model with
a large number of regions that may produce two types of goods. The after tax return
is fixed since regions are assumed to be sufficiently small so that they have a negligible
impact on the capital return. We definitely depart from Wilson by considering a two
country model with endogeneous capital allocation and by analyzing the impact of the
trade balance equilibrium on the tax competition game. In doing so, the constant level of
capital in each region results from the market equilibrium and each price is determined
by the trade balance and depends on the tax rate levels.
In their paper, Becker and Runkel consider the impact of transport cost in a model
of trade with tax competition. Since the traded goods are perfect substitutes, there
is no trade between symmetric regions at the equilibrium and even a small transport
cost restores the efficiency of the public good provision. This result is due to the fact
that transport cost in the product sector makes the capital sticky. In our model, we
obtain a similar result in a quite different framework. We show that even without
transport cost, efficiency of public good provision may be restored when trade balance
is required under a case of symmetric countries. Our paper also highlights the impact
of the preferences of the traded goods and the public goods on the level of public good
provision. A strong taste for the public good implies an underprovision of the public
good but a high asymmetry in preferences among countries for the traded good involves
an overprovision of the public good through an upward distortion of the taxes due to the
prices adjustment. Finally, the centralized equilibrium gives rise to additional results:
while the decentralized and centralized choices perfectly match for symmetric countries,
the constraint on the trade balance avoids the centralized choice to restore the efficiency
of the public good provision when countries are asymmetric. These results are obtained
in a two-country model where the price adjustment allowing for a trade equilibrium
becomes the key element of our tax competition framework, especially when countries
are asymmetric.
To our knowledge, very few papers deal with fiscal coordination in case of asymmetric
countries. Among them, Cardarelli and al. (2002) analyze the sustainability of a tax
harmonization in repeated games. They show that a small country may benefit from
deviating from the harmonized equilibrium if asymmetry between countries is large. Our
analysis of the centralized equilibrium differs also from the paper by Peralta and van
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Ypersele (2006) by two different aspects. First, Peralta and van Ypersele do not consider
trade and second, they consider peculiar types of fiscal coordination (a minimum capital
tax level and a tax range). The purpose of their analysis is to determine the acceptability
of these reforms.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the tax competition
model with trade and derives the results for symmetric countries. In section 3 we
derive the Nash equilibria according to the degree of asymmetry among countries. In
section 4 we characterize the centralized equilibrium and compare the results with the
decentralized equilibrium. The final section summarizes our conclusions.
2 The model
Consider an economy composed of two countries A and B. Each country is specialized
in the production of a distinct good: jurisdiction A produces good a whereas jurisdic-
tion B produces good b. For analytical simplicity, we assume that both jurisdictions
are identical in size, and there is a single consumer in each jurisdiction who wants to
consume both goods. In order to maximize each representative consumer’s welfare, both
jurisdictions are incited to trade with each other.
In each jurisdiction, each firm uses capital to produce its output, this capital being
perfectly mobile between the two jurisdictions, and some locationally fixed factor, such
as land which is held entirely by the representative consumer in each jurisdiction. Each
firm provides its local private good by using the same production technology with de-
creasing returns to scale, that is to say, an increasing, twice continuously-differentiable
and strictly concave function denoted by f (ki) which depends exclusively on capital
demand ki since fixed factors as explicit argument are suppressed from the production
function. Capital being perfectly mobile between countries, the net of tax returns of
capital equal between countries:
ρ = ρi = pif
′(ki)− ti = ri − ti (1)
where pi stands for the price of good i and t
i for the tax on capital in region i. The
demand for capital in country i can be rewritten as ki = k̂i
[
ti+ρ
pi
]
.
Each government provides a public good denoted by gi, i = A,B which is financed
4
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by tax on capital. The government i′s budget constraint writes:
pig
i = tiki (2)
Let cAa and c
A
b be the quantities of good a and good b consumed by country A’s
representative consumer, and let cBa and c
B
b be the quantities consumed by country B’s
representative consumer.
Goods a and b market equilibria write:
f
(
kA
)
= cAa + c
B
a + g
A (3)
and
f
(
kB
)
= cBb + c
A
b + g
B (4)
We assume that consumers of countries A and B have a Cobb-Douglas utility function
UA and UB of the form2:
U i =
(
ci
η
)η (
gi
1−η
)1−η
with i = A,B
where ci is the private consumption in country i, i.e. a bundle of goods produced in
each country such that:
cA =
(
cAa
)α (
cAb
)1−α
; cB =
(
cBb
)β (
cBa
)1−β
with α > β which means that country A’s household value equally or more the domestic
good relative to the imported good than the country B’s household.
The marginal rate of substitution between the national private good and the public
good in country i, hereafter denoted by MRSi is given by
MRSA =
∂UA/∂gA
∂UA/∂cAa
=
1
α
1− η
η
cAa
gA
MRSB =
∂UB/∂gB
∂UB/∂cBb
=
1
β
1− η
η
cBb
gB
2The general case without specifying the utility functions may be studied but with complex and
demanding conditions on the primitives of the model.
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so that
∂MRSi
∂gi
< 0,
∂MRSi
∂cii
> 0 and MRSigi=0 > 0 for all c
i
i > 0
3
Country A consumer’s budget constraint writes:
pac
A
a + pbc
A
b = paf(k
A)− (ρA + tA) kA + ρθA2k (5)
and for the representative consumer in country B it becomes:
pac
B
a + pbc
B
b = pbf(k
B)− (ρB + tB) kB + ρθB2k (6)
2k being the total amount of capital in the economy. The parameter θi stands for the
proportion of the capital owned by the agent of country i and θA + θB = 1. Following
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) we consider θA = θB =
1
2
so that θA2k = θB2k = k.
Finally, each country being specialized in the production of a specific good that
is consumed in both countries, the trade balance equilibrium between both countries
requires:
pbc
A
b = pac
B
a (7)
Inserting (2), (3) and (7) in (5) for country A, and symmetrically for country B,
gives the following relation:4
ki = k ∀i (8)
With a trade balance equilibrium, the level of the capital demand remains unchanged
when the production function faces decreasing returns to scale. A change in the capital
tax rates impacts both the relative price
(
pa
pb
)
and the net return of capital (ρ) so that
the level of capital demand is not affected by capital tax changes since the effects of the
relative price and the net return of capital offset. This result is in line with Becker and
3These conditions are all assumed in Bucovetsky (1991).
4If instead to have two different markets, which is a consequence of the fact that each country is
specialized in the production of a distinct good, we have a world or a common product market, that is
goods a and b are essentially the same, then market equilibria write:
f
(
kA
)
+ f
(
kB
)
= cAa + c
B
a + g
A + cBb + c
A
b + g
B .
In this case the capital demand may be arbitrary (depending on the taxes).
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Runkel (2012)5. This is a key difference with the standard tax competition models in
which the capital tax base is affected by a tax rate modification.
The arbitrage condition allowing for the capital market equilibrium yields:
pa − pb = t
A − tB
f ′
(9)
so that the difference in prices directly depends on the difference in taxes, the marginal
production being fixed due to the adjustments of the prices.
The country i’s representative consumer chooses his level of consumption of both
goods so as to maximize his welfare function subject to his budget constraint. The
maximization program in both jurisdictions gives the following relationships:
α
1− α
cAb
cAa
=
pa
pb
=
1− β
β
cBb
cBa
(10)
and consumptions in goods a and b are given by:
cAb =
(1− α)
pb
[
paf − tAk
]
; cAa =
α
pa
[
paf − tAk
]
cBa =
(1− β)
pa
[
pbf − tBk
]
; cBb =
β
pb
[
pbf − tBk
]
Contrary to Wilson (1986) and Becker & Runkel (2012), relative prices are not
sufficient to specify the equilibrium of the economy so that one of the price cannot be
set as a numeraire. Indeed, our equilibrium requires not only the equilibrium on the
capital and product markets but also on the external market through the balance of
trade. Both the difference in prices and the relative prices matter in the analysis.
Let us briefly develop the symmetric case, which is commonly studied in most of the
tax competition models.
Proposition 1. With symmetric countries,
i) when C0 holds, the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rate is given by t
A∗ = tB∗ =
t = (1− η) f ′
εk
and tax competition with trade induces an optimal provision of public
goods in both countries.
5In Wilson (1987), the fixed stock of capital is given by the assumptions of the model and does not
result from the market equilibrium.
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ii) when C0 does not hold, the symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rate is given by
tA∗ = tB∗ = t = f ′ and tax competition with trade induces an under provision of public
goods in both countries.
with C0 : εk ≥ 1 − η and εk = f ′kf stands for the production function elasticity of
capital.
Proof. See Appendix 1
When the production elasticity dominates the preference for the public good, the
condition ensuring the balance of trade equilibrium restores the efficiency of the capital
tax rates at the symmetric equilibrium. Both countries being perfectly symmetric, the
balance of trade equilibrium requires tA = tB so that pa = pb and
pa
pb
= 1. The provision
of the public good is optimal (MRSi = 1) because the strategic effects implied by the
standard tax competition mechanism is canceled by the prices adjustment. The sym-
metry in preferences for the national good does not distort the external market in favor
of one of the countries6. This result is consistent with Becker and Runkel (2012) while
the mechanisms allowing for the optimality of the public good provision is different. In
the Becker and Rundel’s paper, the price adjustment works through the existence of
transport costs.
Proposition 1 also highlights that the optimality of the public good provision is no longer
valid when the preference for the public good dominates the production elasticity. The
high taste for the public good relative to the production elasticity implies an underpro-
vision of the public good at the equilibrium since more public goods would be desired
by the agents but the arbitrage condition limits its maximum level. Note that the level
of the production elasticity εk is fixed since the level of capital remains unchanged. In
addition, 1 > εk > 0 due to decreasing returns to scale.
3 Asymmetric Countries
In this section, we state α > β so that countries differ in their preferences for the national
good relative to the imported good. In other words, country A’s agent values more the
6We follow the standard literature by defining the inefficient provision of public goods an allocation
characterized by the inequality between the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the marginal rate
of transformation (MRT ) (see Atkinson and Stern (1974)). Here MRT = 1.
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national good than the country B’s agent. This creates an asymmetry in the trade
market that may induce a kind of leadership in the fiscal decision in favor of country A.
Combining Equations (5), (6), (7) and (10) we obtain:
pbc
A
b = (1− α)
[
paf − tAk
]
= (1− β) [pbf − tBk] = pacBa (11)
Condition (11) together with condition (1) given the level of capital (8) allow us to
characterize the prices pa and pb as functions of the taxes:
pa =
(1− β) (tA − tB) (1− εk)
f ′ (α− β) +
εkt
A
f ′
(12)
pb =
(1− α) (tA − tB) (1− εk)
f ′ (α− β) −
εkt
B
f ′
(13)
which implies
dpa
dtA
=
dpb
dtA
+
1
f ′
and
dpb
dtB
=
dpa
dtB
+
1
f ′
(14)
Expressions (12) and (13) show that a large asymmetry between countries impact
the equilibrium prices. Moreover, for given tax rates, a large asymmetry impacts more
pa than pb since it stimulates the demand for good a at the expense of good b. Since
production of both goods is fixed to maintain the capital market equilibrium, prices
adjust so that the trade balance stays in equilibrium.
From the expressions above, we directly derive the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Positive prices requires tA > tB
Proof. pa > 0⇐⇒
(
tA − tB) > − εk
(1−εk)
(α−β)
(1−β) t
A
pb > 0⇐⇒
(
tA − tB) > εk
(1−εk)
(α−β)
(1−α) t
B > 0 for any tB > 0
In country A, households have stronger preferences for the national good which
implies a trade advantage for country A and the possibility to set a higher tax rate
without supporting capital outflows or trade imbalance. As a result, the difference in
prices is always positive (Equation (9)). An increase in the country A’s capital tax
implies an increase in the difference in prices whereas an increase in the country B’s
capital tax implies a decrease in the difference in prices. The difference in prices adjusts
so as to maintain an equal stock of capital in each country. Note that the difference
9
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in prices does not depend on the parameters that characterize the asymmetry between
countries (α and β).
Let us derive the impact of the capital taxes on the prices. With α > β, we obtain:
dpa
dtA
=
f
Ω
((α− β) + (1− α) (1− εk)) > 0; dpa
dtB
=
(1− β)
Ω
f (εk − 1) < 0
dpb
dtA
=
(1− α)
Ω
f (1− εk) > 0; (15)
dpb
dtB
=
f
Ω
((α− β)− (1− β) (1− εk))
>
=
<
0 (16)
d
(
pa
pb
)
dtA
=
tBk
ff ′
1
p2b
> 0;
d
(
pa
pb
)
dtB
= −t
Ak
ff ′
1
p2b
< 0
with Ω = ff ′ (α− β) > 0
The increase in tax in one country has clear-cut effects on the price of the foreign
good. A rise in the tax rate of country A undoubtedly increases the price of good b by
decreasing the demand from country A in good b and increasing the difference in prices
to maintain the capital market equilibrium. In order to maintain the balance trade in
equilibrium, pb increases. The impact of t
B on pa is negative because t
B tends to decrease
the difference in prices. The impact of tA on pa implies an additional argument based on
the asymmetry between countries: the negative direct impact on cAb is relatively smaller
compared to the positive impact on cAb derived from the difference in prices. In order
to adjust the balance of trade, pa has to increase. Finally, contrary to the difference
in prices, the relative price reaction to a change in taxes depends on the asymmetry
between countries through the level of pb. The bigger the asymmetry, the higher the
relative price reaction to a change in taxes.
The impact of tB on pb is not clear-cut. Let us derive the following lemma:
Lemma 2. When the asymmetry between countries is strong enough, dpb
dtB
> 0.
Proof. Directly from Equation (16) we deduce:
dpb
dtB
> 0⇐⇒ (α− β) > (1− β) (1− εf )
10
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Due to the asymmetry, the negative impact on cBa following a rise in t
B can be
either higher or smaller than the negative impact on cAb resulting from the decrease
in the difference in prices. This depends on the size of the asymmetry relative to the
production elasticity. When the asymmetry between countries is high, the impact on
cAb is rather limited so that the impact on c
B
a is relatively high and pb has to increase
to reestablish the balance of trade equilibrium. The opposite result applies when the
asymmetry between countries is rather small.
According to our model, capital supply k is fixed, whenever the solution of (1) and
(8) requires that capital earns a non-negative net return, ρ ≥ 0. When ρ < 0, we assume
that capital owners do not supply any capital:
Claim 1. When ρ < 0, the net return of capital is negative so that the capitalists keep
their capital outside the economy. Utilities of countries A and B vanish.
Before determining the optimal level of taxes we have to specify the set of strategies.
According to the previous claim, the following lemma defines the sets of strategies:
Lemma 3. The profile of strategies t =
(
tA, tB
)
is defined on
[
tB (1−β)
(1−α) , T
]
×
[
0, (1−α)
(1−β) t
A
]
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The sets of strategies are deduced from the different constraints of the model i.e.
positive consumptions and non negative returns to capital. The asymmetry in pref-
erences for the traded good allows country A to set a higher tax. With no particular
restrictions, T →∞. If restrictions on taxes or price levels are given, T can be bounded.
Even if T → ∞ appears to be a particular unrealistic and peculiar case, let us insist
on the fact that only the difference in taxes and therefore the difference in prices and
relative prices matter.
Claim 2. When ρ = 0 the amount of capital in each country is equal to k.
Proof. When tA > (1−β)
(1−α)t
B that implies ρ > 0, we have ki = k. Then lim ki = k when
tA −→
[
(1−α)
(1−β) t
B
]+
so that ki = k for ρ = 0.
The analysis of the marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private
goods is particularly important to analyze the distortive effects of preference asymmetry
on the public good provision.
11
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Lemma 4. Asymmetric countries with α > β imply MRSB >MRSA
with ∂MRS
A
∂tA
> 0, ∂MRS
B
∂tA
> 0, ∂MRS
A
∂tB
< 0 and ∂MRS
B
∂tB
< 0
Proof.
MRSA =
∂UA/∂gA
∂UA/∂cAa
=
1− η
η
[
paf − tAk
]
tAk
=
1− η
η
(1− β) (tA − tB) (f − f ′k)
tAkf ′ (α− β)
and
MRSB =
∂UB/∂gB
∂UB/∂cBb
=
1− η
η
[
pbf − tBk
]
tBk
=
1− η
η
(1− α) (tA − tB) (f − f ′k)
tBkf ′ (α− β)
MRSA > MRSB
⇐⇒
1− η
η
(1− β) (tA − tB) (f − f ′k)
tAkf ′ (α− β) >
1− η
η
(1− α) (tA − tB) (f − f ′k)
tBkf ′ (α− β)
tB > tA
(1− α)
(1− β)
which is a condition that cannot be satisfied according to the constraint of the model
(see proof of lemma 3).
The signs of ∂MRS
A
∂tA
, ∂MRS
B
∂tA
and ∂MRS
B
∂tB
are obvious from the expressions above.
Finally, ∂MRS
A
∂tA
= 1−η
η
(1−β)(f−f ′k)
kf ′(α−β)
tB
(tA)2
> 0
Before determining the properties of the Nash equilibrium, let us define the equilib-
rium:
Definition 1. A profile t∗ =
(
tA∗, tB∗
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ
(
2,
[
tB (1−β)
(1−α) , T
]
×
[
0, (1−α)
(1−β) t
A
])
, if none of the unilateral deviation is profitable ∀i =
A,B.
Let us assume that a Nash equilibrium exists and let us denote this equilibrium by(
tA∗, tB∗
)
7. The following propositions will determine the nature of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. An equilibrium with interior solutions for both countries does not exist.
7The question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium is very difficult and complex. In this paper we
specifically focus on the impact of trade on the tax competition results.
12
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Proof. See Appendix 3
An interior equilibrium for country A requires a marginal rate of substitution higher
than 1 because an increase in the country A’s capital tax implies a decrease in the
public good gA due to a high elasticity of pa
(
∂pa
∂tA
tA
pa
)
. The opposite mechanism works
for country B: a tax rate increase in country B implies a rise in the public good gB
due to a negative or low elasticity of price pb. Hence, an interior solution in country
B requires a marginal rate of substitution lower than 1. According to Lemma 4, both
conditions cannot be fulfilled at the same time. As a result, one of the tax rate will be
constrained by the boundary of its set of strategies. The asymmetry between countries
works as an additional constraint that avoids one of the country to reach an optimal
interior solution.
Proposition 3. Assume that condition C1 holds (large asymmetry between countries).
The asymmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by tA∗ = T and tB∗ solution of ∂V
B
∂tB
=
0 with tA∗ = T.
where C1 : (α− β) >
(
1
ε
− 1) (1− β) (1−η)
η
Proof. see Appendix 4
Because of the high price elasticity of good a, the provision of the public good in
country A decreases with an increase in tA.8 This works for the good a consumption on
the good market. When the asymmetry between countries is large, the marginal rate of
substitution
(
MRSA
)
is lower than one and the increase in the private goods, thanks
to the price adjustment, always dominates the decrease in the public good in the utility
function. Then, the welfare of country A’s agent increases whatever the level of tA. The
country A tax rate is set to its maximum. In country B, the government limits the level
of tB relative to tA since a too high level of tB would imply a higher level of public good
at the expense of the private one.
Corollary 1. Under condition C1 (large asymmetry between countries) tax competition
with trade induces an over provision of public good in both countries.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, we know that MRSB > MRSA.
In Appendix 3, it is shown that an interior solution for country B implies 1 > MRSB.
Both relations induce 1 > MRSB > MRSA.
8 dgA
dtA
= kpa
(
1− ∂pa
∂tA
tA
pa
)
with ∂pa
∂tA
tA
pa
high.
13
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Asymmetry between countries introduces distortive mechanisms in the provision of
public goods but crucially different from the ones observed in the standard tax competi-
tion models. Here, distortions are not driven by the capital market but by the external
market tensions. With no trade, tax competition implies a low level of tax rates and an
underprovision of public goods because of the adjustment on the capital market in order
to verify the arbitrage condition. In our model, since country A’s tax rate is fixed to its
maximum, taxes are distorted upwards which implies an overprovision of public goods
in both countries. As discussed above, a large asymmetry between countries requires
strong adjustments of prices that are harmful for the economic efficiency.
Proposition 4. Assume that conditions C2 and C3 hold (small asymmetry between
countries), the asymmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by
(
tA∗, 1−α
1−β t
A∗
)
with tA∗ 6=
0.
where C2 : ln (α− β) < η(1−η)
[
(1− α) ln (1− εf )− α ln (1−β)(1−β)−(1−α)εf
]
+ln ((1− β)− (1− α) εf )
and C3 : (α− β) <
(
1
εk
− 1
)
(1−η)
η
− 1
Proof. See Appendix 5
Both conditions C2 and C3 specify that the asymmetry between countries is small.
A small asymmetry limits the extent of the relative price adjustment to a change in
tax rates. This vanishes the unlimited positive effect of the country A tax rate on
the agent’s utility since a too high level of tA would imply a negative effect on welfare
because a small asymmetry can no longer compensate the negative effect of the public
good. Conversely, country B benefits from this small asymmetry, and now, is able to fix
a tax rate on the upper bound of its set of strategies without suffering from strong price
adjustments. Note that this equilibrium leads to a zero return of capital but a constant
level of capital, as specified in Claim 2.
Corollary 2. Under conditions C2 and C3 (small asymmetry between countries) tax
competition with trade induces an underprovision of the public good in both countries.
Proof. When tB∗ = 1−α
1−β t
A∗, MRSA = MRSB =
(
1
εf
− 1
)
1−η
η
. Condition C3 immedi-
atly implies MRSB = MRSA > 1
A rather small asymmetry between countries leads to an underprovision of public
goods in both countries. Either in a symmetric or an asymmetric case, when the taste
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for the public good is high relative to the private good, it leads to an underprovision of
the public good since the maximum tax rate is not high enough to ensure an optimal
provision of the public good.
4 Centralized equilibrium
In this section, we compare the decentralized with the centralized equilibrium. The
centralized equilibrium aims to feature the results that would arise in the case of a
centralized European government that would fix the level of the capital tax on behalf
of each country. Before determining the properties of such an equilibrium, let us first
discuss the symmetric case and the impossibility of tax harmonization when countries
are asymmetric.
First, for symmetric countries prices are equal (and so the taxes) so that there is no
difference between the centralized and the decentralized equilibrium. Second, for asym-
metric countries tax harmonization would imply that the centralized government chooses
the level of the uniform tax
(
tA = tB = t
)
that maximizes the sum of the welfare. The
arbitrage condition (9) implies that the prices should be equal if a uniform tax is imple-
mented. As a result, the trade balance cannot be in equilibrium when the preferences
for the national good are asymmetric among countries (Equation (11)). From now, we
concentrate on the case of unequal national taxes determined at the centralized level.
In the centralized equilibrium, the social planner aims to maximize the welfare of
both representative consumers with respect to their strategic variables ti. The program
of the social planner is the following:
max
tA,tB
V C where V C = UA + UB
Comparing the centralized results to the decentralized results leads to the following
proposition
Proposition 5. If V C is concave, the asymmetric centralized equilibrium implies lower
or equal tax rates compared to the Nash equilibrium when either C1 or C2 and C3 hold
(large or small asymmetry between countries).
Proof. See Appendix 6.
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This result is definitely different from the standard tax competition results that
highlight the too low level of the tax rates at the Nash equilibrium compared to the
centralized choice. An analysis of the impact of the tax rates on the marginal rate of
substitution implies the following lemma:
Lemma 5. A decrease (resp. increase) in tA and tB
• implies an increase (resp. decrease) in the marginal rates of substitution in both
countries (MRSA and MRSB) if and only if the tax response elasticity ( t
B
tA
dtA
dtB
) is
lower (resp. higher) than 1
• does not modify the marginal rates of substitution in both countries if and only if
the tax response elasticity is equal to 1.
Proof. See Appendix 7.
Following a decrease in tB, the increase or decrease in the marginal rates of sub-
stitution depends on the tax response elasticity
(
dtA
dtB
tB
tA
)
9. The tax reponse elasticity
characterizes the response of country A’s tax rate to a change of country B’s tax rate. A
small tax response elasticity implies a weak reaction of country A’s tax rate to a change
in country B’s tax rate. Since MRSA responds positively to a decrease in country B’s
tax rate, this effect dominates the effect on MRSA of the country A’s tax rate response.
As a result, the MRS increases in country A. For country B the same mechanism
applies.
Proposition 6. Compared to the Nash equilibrium;
• If dtA
dtB
tB
tA
> 1, the centralized equilibrium worsens the overprovision of public goods
in Country A and B when C1 holds.
• If dtA
dtB
tB
tA
< 1, the centralized equilibrium worsens the underprovision of public goods
in Country A and B when C2 and C3 hold.
• If dtA
dtB
tB
tA
= 1, the centralized equilibrium does not modify the provision of public
goods and inefficiencies of public goods provision remain unchanged.
9The term ”tax response elasticity” has been introduced by Hindriks and Nishimura (2014) by
contrast with the tax base elasticity.
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Proof. Using Proposition 6, we know that t∗AN > t
∗A
C and t
∗B
N > t
∗B
C so that from the Nash
to the centralized equilibrium we have dt
A
dtB
> 0. Given that dMRS
B
dtB
< 0 and dMRS
A
dtA
> 0,
we can deduce that
dMRSB > 0⇐⇒ dt
A
dtB
tB
tA
6 1 and dMRSA > 0⇐⇒ dt
A
dtB
tB
tA
6 1 (17)
Finally, using Corollary 1 and 2, we obtain the Proposition 6 results.
While a centralized equilibrium is supposed to limit inefficiencies by taking into
account the externalities of the taxes, this result is no longer systematically valid in
the particular case of asymmetric countries that we developed. This is due to the con-
straint on the external equilibrium which avoids both a tax harmonization to exist when
countries are asymmetric, and a centralized equilibrium to reach the optimum. The in-
troduction of such a constraint enables to avoid any tax competition by maintaining
the capital level unchanged in each country; however at the expense of price adjustment
that implies tax levels leading to an inefficient provision of public goods even in the
centralized equilibrium. The tax response elasticity together with the degree of asym-
metry is particularly crucial in determining the degree of inefficiency of the public good
provision. Two cases are particularly interesting to comment. When the tax response
elasticity is high and the asymmetry is small, the centralized equilibrium tends to ex-
acerbate the overprovision of the public goods. Indeed, a high tax response elasticity
implies a decrease in the marginal rate of substitution following a decrease in the tax
rates because the country A’s tax rate response is high (in absolute value) relative to
the country B’s tax rate response. Conversely, when the tax response elasticity is lower
that 1 and the asymmetry is large, the centralized equilibrium worsens the underpovi-
sion. Finally a tax response elasticity equal to one does not modify the inefficiencies
of public good provision arising from the Nash equilibrium with a centralized choice.
Note that we are not able to give clear-cut results when both the response elasticity
and th asymmetry are high or low. Indeed, the centralization may either diminish the
inefficiency of the public good provision or imply an overprovision of public good while
the Nash equilibrium involved an underprovision (and vice versa).
17
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a capital tax competition model with trade. We show
that the trade balance equilibrium crucially modifies the tax competition mechanisms
by maintaining the level of capital unchanged between countries. This may lead to an
optimal level of public good provision in a symmetric countries framework. When agents
have asymmetric preferences among countries, the Nash equilibrium is conditional to
the degree of asymmetry. It may imply either an overprovision or an underprovision of
public goods. The link between the trade market and the capital market creates pressure
on prices that are not investigated in standard tax competition models. In concordance
with several papers that mitigate the benefit of fiscal cooperation among asymmetric
countries, we show that a centralized choice may worsen the inefficient provision of
public goods. In light with these papers, another conclusion arising from our work is
that inefficiencies of public good provision may be mitigated by a centralized choice,
but at the expense of trade imbalances. If we try to apply our results for European
countries, our paper shows that a centralized choice will not mitigate the inefficiency of
public goods provision for asymmetric countries (for example Germany and Ireland) if
the tax response elasticity is rather small or equal to one; a scenario which is the more
consistent with the European case. The mitigation of the inefficiency may apply under
trade imbalances.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1
Let us assume that α = β so that countries are perfectly symmetric.
The constraint on the balance of trade together with the arbitrage condition imply
pa − pb =
(
tA − tB) k
f
=
(
tA − tB) 1
f ′
so that for any f ′k 6= f we have pa = pb , tA = tB = t and gA = gB = g . We deduce
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the expressions of the private and public consumptions as
gA = gB =
tk
p
cAa = c
B
b = α
(
f − tk
p
)
cAb = c
B
a = (1− α)
(
f − tk
p
)
Normalizing the common price to the unity (p = 1), we deduce that the indirect utility
functions denoted by V A ≡ V A(t) and V B ≡ V B(t) with t ∈ [0, f ′] according to the
arbitrage condition.
They can be rewritten as
V i = U i
[
f − g − cji , cji , g
]
with i = A,B, j = A,B and i 6= j
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the indirect utility function
of both countries:
∂V i
∂t
= − ∂U
i
∂cii
dg
dt
+
∂U i
∂g
dg
dt
=
∂U i
∂cii
dg
dt
(
MRSi − 1) = 0
so that
MRSi = 1
Since
MRSi =
∂U i/∂gi
∂U i/∂cii
=
1− η
η
f − g
g
MRSi = 1 => t∗ = (1− η) f
k
Let us check that t = (1− η) f
k
is an interior solution.
(1− η) f
k
6 f ′ ⇐⇒ ε+ η > 1
When ε + η < 1, MRSi > 1 ∀ t ∈ [0, f ′] and the Nash solution is on the boundary
so that t∗ = f ′.
To complete the proof we have to check the concavity of the indirect utility functions:
19
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At the equilibrium we have ∂(V )
2
∂t2
= ∂U
i
∂cii
dg
dt
∂MSRi
∂t
= −∂U i
∂cii
(
dg
dt
1
g
)2
1−η
η
< 0 . This
condition ensures that there exists only one maximum.
6.2 Appendix 2
A non negative return of capital (ρ > 0) implies
paf
′ > tA and pbf ′ > tB
and replacing pa and pb gives the same constraint:
tA > (1− β)
(1− α)t
B
Consumptions in goods a and b are given by:
cAb =
(1− α)
pb
[
paf − tAk
]
; cAa =
α
pa
[
paf − tAk
]
cBa =
(1− β)
pa
[
pbf − tBk
]
; cBb =
β
pb
[
pbf − tBk
]
According to the budget constraint of the household, positive consumptions in both
countries require
paf > tAk and pbf > tBk
Replacing pa and pb by their expressions (12) and (13) leads to the same constraint for
both countries: (
tB − tA) (f − f ′k) 6 0⇐⇒ tB 6 tA (18)
Compiling these conditions gives:
tA > (1− β)
(1− α)t
B > tB > 0
and
0 6 tB 6 (1− α)
(1− β) t
A < tA
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6.3 Appendix 3
In the case of a non-cooperative game, each government i, i = A,B aims to maximize
the welfare of its representative consumer with respect to its strategic variable ti, taking
the tax rate of the other government as given.
∂V A
∂tA
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
−dgA
dtA
− 1
pa
cAb
(
dpb
dtA
− pb
pa
dpa
dtA
)]
+
∂UA
∂gA
dgA
dtA
(19)
∂V B
∂tB
=
∂UB
∂cBb
[
−dgB
dtB
− 1
pb
cBa
(
dpa
dtA
− pa
pb
dpb
dtA
)]
+
∂UB
∂gB
dgB
dtB
(20)
For country A, (19) rewrites
∂V A
∂tA
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tA
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)]
with (
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)
=
(β − α) tBk
Ωpa
< 0
and
∂gA
∂tA
=
(1− β) tBk (f ′k − f)
Ω (pa)
2 < 0
An interior solution with positive consumptions requires
MRSA = 1 +
cAb (α− β)
(1− β) (f − f ′k) > 1
For country B we obtain
∂V B
∂tB
=
∂UB
∂cBb
[
∂gB
∂tB
(
MRSB − 1)− 1
pb
cBa
(
∂pa
∂tB
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tB
)]
with (
∂pa
∂tB
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tB
)
=
(β − α) tAk
Ωpb
< 0
and
∂gB
∂tB
=
(1− α) tAk (f − f ′k)
Ω (pb)
2 > 0
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An interior solution with positive consumptions requires
MRSB = 1 +
cBa (α− β)
(1− α) (f ′k − f) < 1
Then an interior solution in both countries requires
MRSA > MRSB
which is inconsistent with Lemma 4.
6.4 Appendix 4:
For country A, (19) rewrites
∂V A
∂tA
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tA
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)]
with (
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)
=
(α− β) tBk
∆pa
< 0
Then if MRSA < 1, we have ∂V
A
∂tA
> 0 ∀tA for tB 6= 0
MRSA =
(1− η)
η
(
tB − tA)
tAk
(1− β) (f − f ′k)
f ′ (β − α)
=
(
tA − tB)
tA
(1− β)
(β − α)
(
1
ε
− 1
)
(1− η)
η
since
(tA−tB)
tA
< 1, a sufficient condition that ensuresMRSA < 1 ∀tA is (1−β)
(α−β)
(
1
ε
− 1) (1−η)
η
<
1. Let us denote this condition by C1 and rewrite it as:
C1 : α− β >
(
1
ε
− 1
)
(1− η)
η
(1− β)
The best reply for country B is neither tB = 0 which implies V B = 0, nor tB =
tA (1−α)
(1−β) which implies t
A∗ = tB∗ 1−β
1−α which contradicts C1. Then the best response t
B∗
is interior. Let us rewrite ∂V
B
∂tB
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∂V B
∂tB
=
∂UB
∂cBb
(
1
pb
)2 (1− α) tA (f ′k − f)
∆ηtBf ′ (β − α) paΩ ·[(
(1− η) (1− α) (tB − tA) (f − f ′k)− ηtBkf ′ (β − α)) paΩ
−ηtBk (1− β) (tB − tA) ff ′ (α− β)2]
Let denote by Z
(
tB
)
Z
(
tB
)
=
[(
(1− η) (1− α) (tB − tA) (f − f ′k)− ηtBkf ′ (β − α)) paΩ
− (1− β) tB (tB − tA) fηkf ′ (α− β)2]
Z
(
tB
)
is a second degree polynomial of the form
Z
(
tB
)
= z1t
B2 + z2t
B + z3
so that Z
(
tB
)
= 0 admits only two roots.
The existence of two maxima is impossible since a minimum would necessarily exist
between the maxima and more than two roots would exist. The best response tB∗ is
then unique and tB∗ ∈
]
0, (1−α)
(1−β) t
A
[
.
6.5 Appendix 5:
Let us consider that C1 does not hold. From Proposition 1 we know that an equilibrium
with two interior solutions does not exist. Then at least one strategy of the equilibrium
must be on the boundary.
1. tB = 0 implies V B = 0 so that tB = 0 is dominated by any strategies which insure
V B 6= 0.
2. Let analyze the case tA = T
Without particular restrictions, tA is defined on
[
tB (1−β)
(1−α) ,∞
]
. Let us compare the
values of V A for tA = tB (1−β)
(1−α) and t
A 7→ ∞.
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• When tA = tB (1−β)
(1−α) we have
pa =
tA
f ′
and pb =
tB
f ′
gA = f ′k
cAa = α
[
f − f ′k] and cAa = (1− β) [f − f ′k]
Then the utility writes
V A
(
tB
(1− β)
(1− α)
)
=
(
αα (1− β)1−α (f − f ′k)
η
)η (
f ′k
1− η
)1−η
• When tA 7→ ∞ we have
lim
tA 7→∞
pa
pb
=
(1− β) f − (1− α) f ′k
(1− β) f − (1− β) f ′k > 1
lim
tA 7→∞
gA =
ff ′ (α− β) k
(1− β) f − (1− α) f ′k
lim
tA 7→∞
cAa = α (1− β) f
f − f ′k
(1− β) f − (1− α) f ′k and limtA 7→∞c
A
a = (1− α) f
Then the utility writes
lim
tA 7→∞
V A =
f
(
α (1− β) f−f ′k
(1−β)f−(1−α)f ′k
)α
(1− β)1−α
η
η ( f ′f (α− β) k
(1− η) (1− β) f − (1− α) f ′k
)1−η
And we have
V A
(
tB
(1− β)
(1− α)
)
> lim
tA 7→∞
V A
⇐⇒
((
(1− β)
(1− β)− (1− α) εf
)α(
1
(1− εf )
)1−α)η (
(α− β)
(1− β)− (1− α) εf
)1−η
< 1
24
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.14
This last condition can be rewritten as:
C2 : η
[
α ln
(1− β)
(1− β)− (1− α) εf − (1− α) ln (1− εf )
]
+(1− η) ln (α− β)
(1− β)− (1− α) εf < 0
Then under Condition C2, V
A
(
tB (1−β)
(1−α)
)
> lim
tA 7→∞
V A and since V A
(
tB (1−β)
(1−α)
)
is of
constant value whatever the value of tB, then there exists a finite T such that for
any tA > T , lim
tA 7→∞
V A is strictly dominated by V A
(
tB (1−β)
(1−α)
)
.
3. Let us assume tA = 1−β
1−α t
B. At this point we know that we have
∂V A
∂tA
(
tA∗, tB∗
)
< 0 which implies
∂V A
∂tA
(
tA∗, tB∗
)
=
∂UA
∂cAa
(
1
pa
)2 tB2 (f − f ′k)
∆ηf ′f ′pb
(1− β) ·[(
(1− η) (f − f ′k))+ ηkf ′ (β − α− 1)] < 0
⇐⇒ ((1− η) (f − f ′k))+ ηkf ′ (β − α− 1) > 0
⇐⇒ 1
εf
− 1 > η
(1− η) (1 + α− β) : C3
According to Appendix 3, an interior solution for B implies MRSB < 1.
For tA = 1−β
1−α t
B, we obtain MRSB =
(
1
εf
− 1
)
1−η
η
> 1 under C3 which eliminates any
interior solution for tB.
Let us check that we also have ∂V
B
∂tB
(
tA∗, tB∗
)
> 0
∂V B
∂tB
(
tA∗, tB∗
)
=
∂UB
∂cBb
(1− α) (f ′k − f)
∆η
(
1− β
1− α
)
·[(
(1− η) (f − f ′k)− ηkf ′)− ηkf ′ (β − α)] > 0
⇐⇒ (1− η) (f − f ′k)− ηkf ′ (1 + β − α) > 0
1
εk
− 1 > η
(1− η) (1 + β − α)
which is always true under C3.
As a result, under C3, when a Nash equilibrium exists, it is given by
(
tA∗, 1−α
1−β t
A∗
)
.
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6.6 Appendix 6
• The first derivative of the indirect utility functions V C are:
∂V C
∂tA
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tA
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)]
+
∂UB
∂cBb
[
∂gB
∂tA
(
MRSB − 1)− 1
pb
cBa
(
∂pa
∂tA
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tA
)]
∂V C
∂tB
=
∂UB
∂cBb
[
∂gB
∂tB
(
MRSB − 1)− 1
pb
cBa
(
∂pa
∂tB
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tB
)]
+
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tB
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tB
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tB
)]
• If C1 holds, ∂V C∂tB evaluated at the Nash equilibrium, gives
∂V C
∂tB
∣∣∣∣
Nash
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tB
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tB
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tB
)]
(21)
with ∂pb
∂tB
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tB
> 0; MRSA < 1; dgA
dtB
= − tAk
(pa)
2
dpa
dtB
> 0; so that ∂V
S
∂tB
(
t∗BN
)
< 0.
If a centralized equilibrium exists and V C is concave, then ∂V
S
∂tB
(
t∗BN
)
< 0 implies that
t∗BN > t
∗B
C .
Since the Nash equilibrium implies the highest tax rate for country A, the tax rate
at the centralized equilibrium cannot be higher (t∗AN ≥ t∗AC ).
• If C2 and C3 hold, ∂V C∂tB evaluated at the Nash equilibrium, gives
∂V C
∂tA
∣∣∣∣
Nash
=
∂UA
∂cAa
[
∂gA
∂tA
(
MRSA − 1)− 1
pa
cAb
(
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂UB
∂cBb
[
∂gB
∂tA
(
MRSB − 1)− 1
pb
cBa
(
∂pa
∂tA
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tA
)]
< 0
since ∂g
B
∂tA
= 1−α
α−β
f ′k
f
1
tA
(
f ′k − f) < 0, MRSB > 1 and ( ∂pa
∂tA
− pa
pb
∂pb
∂tA
)
= −pa
pb
(
∂pb
∂tA
− pb
pa
∂pa
∂tA
)
>
0.
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Under the assumption that V C is concave, we can deduce that t∗AN > t
∗A
S . Finally,
the collective utility V C is defined on
[
tB (1−β)
(1−α) , T
]
×
[
0, (1−α)
(1−β) t
A
]
. Under C2 and
C3, we have t
∗B
N =
1−α
1−β t
∗A
N >
1−α
1−β t
∗A
C where
1−α
1−β t
∗A
C is the upper level that t
B could
take in response to tAC . This implies that t
∗B
N > t
∗B
C .
6.7 Appendix 7
According to Lemma 1 and its proof we can write
∂MRSA
∂tA
=
1− η
η
(1− β) (f − f ′k)
kf ′ (α− β)
tB
(tA)2
= −∂MRS
A
∂tB
tB
tA
so that the total derivative of MRSA is given by
dMRSA =
∂MRSA
∂tA
dtA +
∂MRSA
∂tB
dtB =
∂MRSA
∂tA
tA
tB
dtB
(
tB
tA
dtA
dtB
− 1
)
with ∂MRS
A
∂tA
> 0.
For country B
∂MRSB
∂tB
=
1− η
η
(1− α) (f − f ′k)
kf ′ (α− β)
tA
(tB)2
= −∂MRS
B
∂tB
tB
tA
dMRSB =
∂MRSB
∂tB
dtB +
∂MRSB
∂tA
dtA =
∂MRSB
∂tB
dtB
(
1− t
B
tA
dtA
dtB
)
with ∂MRS
B
∂tB
< 0.
For t
B
tA
dtA
dtB
= 1, dMRSB = 0 and dMRSA = 0.
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